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CAUGHT BETWEEN SUPERPOWERS:
ALASKA’S ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA
AMIDST THE NEW COLD WAR
Sam Karson*
ABSTRACT
In recent years, Alaska has developed an increasingly robust economic
relationship with China. China is the largest foreign buyer of Alaskan goods
and China continues to invest in Alaska and promote Alaskan tourism.
Meanwhile, the U.S. federal government’s relationship with China has
deteriorated over concerns that China poses a danger to U.S. national security.
As the U.S. federal government continues to scrutinize Chinese investment
and trade with the United States, Alaska’s economic relationship with China
increasingly hangs in the balance. Alaska’s relationship with China thus joins
a long history of economic ties between states and foreign nations that pose
conflicts of interest for the U.S. federal government. Beginning with the
ratification of the U.S. Constitution and leading up to the present, the states
have staked out a role as advocates on behalf of their citizens in promoting
economic ties with foreign nations. This Note argues that the anticommandeering doctrine provides constitutional protection for Alaska’s
promotion of its economic relationship with China from interference by the
U.S. federal government. While the federal government may itself regulate
commerce between Alaska and China, the federal government may not muzzle
the Alaska state government and prevent it from promoting commerce with
China. While this state of play might seem like a hollow victory for Alaska, the
anti-commandeering doctrine requires the federal government to take action
itself — rather than coerce Alaska to take action — and thus forces the federal
government to expend greater political capital in passing a law or regulation.
The anti-commandeering doctrine thus properly apportions political
accountability among the state and federal governments and makes federal
intervention less likely.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 6, 2018, then-Governor of Alaska Bill Walker celebrated a
successful trade mission to China, where delegates from Alaska attended
more than twenty-five meetings across China over ten days.1 Governor
Walker stated,
I was honored to lead this trade mission and watch so many
Alaskan leaders work to grow their businesses and bring jobs
home. Perhaps what impressed me the most was the consistent
push to build an Alaska brand that makes the world realize the
quality of our fresh seafood, the natural beauty of our state, and
our many opportunities for economic growth.2
This trade mission was part of Governor Walker’s “Opportunity
Alaska” initiative, led by Alaska’s Office of International Trade, which
seeks to grow Alaska’s export and investment relationship with its largest
trading partner, China.3 Governor Walker stated,
Throughout 2017, the State of Alaska made significant inroads
with [Chinese] companies and government officials, including
meeting with President Xi Jinping and Cabinet-level officials.4
Alaska’s relationship with China, however, comes with
complications. On August 16, 2018, only two months after the Alaska
delegation’s visit to China, cybersecurity firm Recorded Future5 released
a report detailing a Chinese government-linked hacking group’s attempts
to penetrate computer servers belonging to the Alaska state government.6
1. Opportunity Alaska: China Trade Mission Delegates Return Home, BILL
WALKER, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR (June 6, 2018), https://gov.alaska.gov/
newsroom/2018/06/opportunity-alaska-china-trade-mission-delegates-returnhome/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20181018063905/https://gov.alaska.gov
/newsroom/2018/06/opportunity-alaska-china-trade-mission-delegates-returnhome/].
2. Id.
3. Governor Bill Walker: Opportunity Alaska China Trade Mission 2018, BILL
WALKER, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, https://gov.alaska.gov/services/office-ofinternational-trade/alaska-china-trade-mission/ [https://web.archive.org/web
/20181020084928/https://gov.alaska.gov/services/office-of-internationaltrade/alaska-china-trade-mission/] (last visited Dec. 16, 2018).
4. Id.
5. Recorded Future is a private cyber threat intelligence firm that uses
proprietary software to gather and analyze vast amounts of data to provide
insights about cyber threats to their clients. Threat Intelligence Machine, RECORDED
FUTURE, https://www.recordedfuture.com/technology/ (last visited Dec. 15,
2018).
6. Christopher Bing & Jack Stubbs, Chinese Hackers Targeted U.S. Firms,
Government After Trade Mission: Researchers, REUTERS (Aug. 16, 2018, 8:06 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-cyber/chinese-hackers-
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According to Recorded Future, these attempts occurred in the weeks
before and after Governor Walker’s trade mission to China.7 Recorded
Future submitted their report to the FBI, but the Alaska Governor’s Office
seemed unconcerned: “[E]veryday [sic], the State of Alaska, like most
state governments, has anonymous activity on the perimeter of our
networks that amounts to someone checking if the door is locked. The
activity referenced here is not unique.”8
This incident nevertheless underscores the complex and, at times,
adversarial relationship between China and the United States and the
conflicts of interest that can arise between the U.S. federal government
and the states. Alaska may decide that some Chinese hacking is
acceptable if challenging it would threaten the state’s robust economic
relationship with China. The U.S. federal government, however, may take
the position that Chinese hacking is an unacceptable national security
threat subject to criminal indictment9 and diplomatic repercussions.10
Indeed, recent trends in U.S.-China relations have stoked tensions
between the two superpowers with increased Chinese hacking of
American entities, increased economic espionage by Chinese agents in the
United States, and a “trade war” involving tariffs and export controls.11
On a broader strategic level, China has been acquiring American
technology and other American businesses at a rapid rate to advance its
domestic industries as part of its “Made in China 2025” plan.12 There is
also a growing consensus that China is using trade and investment to
“manipulate financial networks, political processes, and public debate” in
the United States and elsewhere.13 Thus, while Alaska and its citizens may
welcome the money and jobs that economic engagement with China
targeted-u-s-firms-govt-after-trade-mission-researchers-idUSKBN1L11D2.
Recorded Future uncovered these attempts to hack Alaska state government
servers as part of Recorded Future’s own research into Chinese government
hacking. Sanil Chohan et al., Chinese Cyberespionage Originating from Tsinghua
University Infrastructure, RECORDED FUTURE (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.record
edfuture.com/chinese-cyberespionage-operations/. Recorded Future assessed
that China’s attempts to hack Alaska government servers after the trade
delegation’s visit “was likely an attempt to gain insight into the Alaskan
perspective on the trip and strategic advantage in the post-visit negotiations.” Id.
Recorded Future found that China had also attempted to conduct cyberespionage
on organizations in Kenya, Brazil, and Mongolia related to potential Chinese
investment in those countries. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See infra Section II.B.
10. See infra Section II.B.
11. See infra Section II.B.
12. Charles Edel, The China Challenge, THE AMERICAN INTEREST (Aug. 24, 2018),
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/08/24/the-china-challenge/.
13. Id.
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brings, the U.S. federal government has legitimate reasons to worry about
Alaska’s growing relationship with China.
Alaska’s growing relationship with China is by no means the first to
raise concerns about conflicts of interest with the U.S. federal
government, nor is it a state’s first foray into foreign affairs.14 In fact,
leading up to the U.S. Constitution’s ratification, the colonies were
extensively involved in foreign commerce and continued to engage in
foreign commerce for some time after ratification.15 Over the course of the
19th century, the Supreme Court, the President, and Congress fought to
wrest control of foreign commerce from the states and, by World War II
and the Cold War, foreign commerce was largely within the exclusive
realm of the federal government.16
Nevertheless, since North Carolina Governor Luther Hodges’s trade
mission to Europe in 1959, states have begun to reclaim their roles in
foreign commerce.17 Over the last sixty years, states have increasingly
entered into cooperative agreements with foreign nations and subnational units, adopted international standards, led trade delegations,
opened overseas offices, pursued foreign direct investment, attracted
multinational corporations, encouraged the export of goods overseas, and
established sister-city and other relationships with foreign cities, among
other functions.18
While the states have recently become more active in foreign
commerce, the federal government nonetheless retains several
constitutional and statutory powers to control foreign commerce.19
Indeed, there is a robust debate as to the states’ proper place in foreign
commerce and the extent to which the states may constitutionally engage
in foreign relations if at all.20 Some have argued that the Constitution
entirely excludes the states from participation in foreign commerce and

14. See generally EARL H. FRY, THE EXPANDING ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS IN U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1998).
15. Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant
Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1198–1205 (2000).
16. Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1227–
28 (1999).
17. Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV. 741, 749
(2010).
18. MICHAEL J. GLENNON & ROBERT D. SLOANE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM
38–45 (2016).
19. See infra Section IV.A.
20. See id; see generally Ryan Baasch & Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Congress
and the Reconstruction of Foreign Affairs Federalism, 115 MICH. L. REV. 47 (2016);
Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the ‘One-Voice’ Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, 46
VILL. L. REV. 975 (2001); Hollis, supra note 17; Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the
States in Foreign Affairs: The Original Understanding of Foreign Affairs Federalism, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341 (1999); Spiro, supra note 16; Swaine, supra note 15.
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foreign affairs.21 Other scholars point out, however, that many of the
states’ core regulatory activities may implicate foreign commerce.22 These
scholars argue that while the states may participate in foreign commerce,
Congress may exclude the states from foreign commerce through
preemption.23 Nevertheless, scholars generally agree that state
participation in foreign commerce, if allowed at all, is subject to federal
regulation.24
Federal regulation of state participation in foreign commerce may,
however, conflict with the anti-commandeering doctrine. First developed
in New York v. United States25 and Printz v. United States,26 the anticommandeering doctrine dictates that “Congress may not simply
commandeer the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling
them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.”27 In 2018, the
Court reaffirmed this doctrine, explaining that Congress may not issue “a
direct command to the States.”28 The anti-commandeering doctrine
protects the traditional balance of power between the federal government
and the states, ensuring that each level of government is held accountable
for its actions.29
This Note will argue that, while Congress may regulate foreign
commerce itself under the Foreign Commerce Clause, the anticommandeering doctrine prevents Congress from prohibiting the Alaska
state government’s promotion of its economic relationship with China.30
21. See, e.g., Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 572 (1840) (Taney, C.J., plurality
opinion) (“[T]he framers of the Constitution . . . anxiously desired to cut off all
connection or communication between a state and a foreign power . . . .”).
22. See, e.g., ERNEST A. YOUNG, FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM IN THE UNITED
STATES 4–11 (2018) (on file with author) (describing the influence that state policies
on taxation, criminal law enforcement, and immigration law can have on foreign
affairs).
23. See Cleveland, supra note 20, at 975.
24. As two scholars point out:
No one questions . . . Congress’s authority to preempt state initiatives by
legislating within the scope of its Article I powers, including those
foreign affairs powers it shares with the president. Nor does anyone
question executive authority to preempt state measures by the exercise
of those constitutional powers vested exclusively in the president by
Article II.
GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 18, at xxi.
25. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
26. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
27. New York, 505 U.S. at 161.
28. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1481 (2018). Murphy was the first major
Supreme Court ruling to rely on the anti-commandeering doctrine since Reno v.
Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
29. Id. at 1478.
30. This Note defines Alaska’s economic relationship with China to include
conducting trade missions to China, promoting Alaska exports to China, and
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To do so would force Alaska to implement the federal government’s
foreign policy towards China in violation of the anti-commandeering
doctrine. This argument stakes out a constitutionally protected role for
states in foreign commerce based on a careful study of the historical and
current roles of states in foreign commerce, which have largely been
ignored by federalism scholars,31 and a recently reaffirmed anticommandeering doctrine.32
This Note will proceed in three parts. Section II explains Alaska’s
economic relationship with China and the conflicts of interest it poses
with the U.S. federal government. Section III describes the historical
background of the states’ participation in foreign commerce against
which the China-Alaska relationship is set. Section IV argues that the anticommandeering doctrine protects Alaska’s promotion of its economic
relationship with China from the U.S. federal government’s power to
regulate foreign commerce. Because the Trump administration’s
relationship with China is constantly fluctuating,33 an examination of the
political and legal status of Alaska’s own relationship with China is even
more important.

II. THE CHINA CONNECTION: ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES AND
NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS
Alaska and China have developed a robust trade, investment, and
tourism relationship.34 This relationship is complicated by the U.S. federal
government’s increasing regulation of Chinese trade and investment as a
response to perceived Chinese threats to U.S. national security. This
promoting Chinese investment and tourism in Alaska.
31. See, e.g., Baasch & Prakash, supra note 20, at 50 (“The states should stand
deaf and mute in the foreign arena because they lack the expertise and knowledge
necessary to engage in that arena. States lack a cadre of resident international
specialists (State Department bureaucrats) and do not have the benefit of semipermanent officials stationed abroad (ambassadors and their extensive retinue of
experts)”). As this Note explains, the states do in fact have domestic and overseas
offices and officials dedicated to foreign commerce. See infra Section III.C.
32. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1461.
33. Matthew Lee & Rob Gillies, US, Canada Look to Ease Strains Amid 3-Way
Spat with China, AP NEWS (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/c8cab06b
7fd94498a7b8b06b2c8ab8a7; Joe McDonald, China Suspends Tariff Hikes on U.S.
Cars, Auto Parts, AP NEWS (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/
87669a6f4b70486fb48c3f5134d18d72; Christopher Bing, U.S. to Reveal Charges
Against Chinese Hackers: Sources, REUTERS (Dec. 7, 2018, 3:49 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-china/u-s-to-reveal-chargesagainst-chinese-hackers-sources-idUSKBN1O62D8.
34. See THE US-CHINA BUSINESS COUNCIL, ALASKA’S EXPORTS TO CHINA 1
(2018), https://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/uscbc_alaska_state
_report_2018_0.pdf.
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Section will first discuss Alaska’s economic relationship with China,
including the Alaska state government’s efforts to promote the state’s
economic relationship with China. This Section will then discuss Chinese
threats to U.S. national security and how the federal government has
responded by regulating Chinese trade and investment.
A. Alaska’s Economic Relationship with China
China was Alaska’s largest trading partner in 2017, during which
Alaska exported $1.3 billion worth of goods and $135 million worth of
services to China.35 Alaska’s exports to China represented over a quarter
of Alaska’s overall exports in 2017 and included $860 million of marine
products, $356 million of mineral ore, $49 million of oil and gas, and $48
million of forest products, among other exports.36 By comparison, Alaska
exported $813 million of goods to Japan, $705 million of goods to Canada,
$669 million of goods to South Korea, and $182 million of goods to
Germany.37 Since 2008, Alaska’s exports to China have grown 81%, while
Alaska’s collective exports to the rest of the world grew an average of only
28%.38 In 2016, Alaskan exports to China supported 6100 American jobs.39
The Alaska state government has gone to great lengths to promote
its economic relationship with China, including exports, investment, and
tourism. On April 8, 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping stopped in
Anchorage to meet with Alaska Governor Bill Walker on his way home
from meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump at Mar-a-Lago in
Florida.40 In Anchorage, the two leaders discussed Alaskan exports,
including seafood and oil and gas, Alaska’s service as a hub for air cargo,
Chinese tourism in Alaska, and a liquefied natural gas export project that
would connect Alaska and China.41 Following the meeting, Governor
Walker stated that “[President Xi] felt that as a result of his coming to
Alaska, we will see an uptick of tourism from China.”42 In 2016, Alaska
received approximately 1.2 million Chinese tourists, many of whom
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Jeannette Lee Falsey, A Surprise Guest: Chinese President Makes Anchorage
Stopover, Meets Gov. Walker and Takes in Some Sights, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Apr.
8, 2017), https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/2017/04/07/chinese-presidentmakes-surprise-visit-to-alaska-following-summit-with-trump/.
41. Jeanette Lee Falsey, Gov. Walker Breaks Down His Alaska Meeting with
Chinese President Xi Jinping, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Apr. 9, 2017),
https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/2017/04/08/gov-walker-breaks-downhis-meeting-with-chinese-president-xi-jinping/.
42. Id.
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traveled to Fairbanks to view the aurora borealis.43 On May 25, 2018,
Alaska tourism promoter Explore Fairbanks announced that it had signed
a deal with Chinese tourism company East West Marketing Corporation
to promote Alaskan tourism in China, including establishing an Alaskan
presence on Chinese social media.44
President Xi’s visit to Anchorage led to Governor Walker’s 2017
trade mission to China.45 The trade mission included Governor Walker
and other state officials, as well as representatives of the seafood industry,
tourism industry, local economic development organizations, a baby food
company, and a craft brewery, among other entities.46 The delegation’s
meetings took place in Chengdu, Beijing, Shanghai, and Hangzhou,
where delegates met with businesses including Chinese e-commerce
giants JD.com and Alibaba Group.47 The delegates also sought to establish
direct flights between Alaska and China and even met with China’s
Sports Minister to discuss having Chinese Olympic athletes train in
Alaska.48 The Chinese downhill and cross-country ski teams and ice
hockey team will all participate in year-long training in Alaska to prepare
for the 2022 Winter Olympics.49
Another major topic discussed during Governor Walker’s trade
mission to China was the Alaska Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Project.50
On November 9, 2017, Governor Walker signed a joint development
agreement with Chinese energy company Sinopec, China’s sovereign
wealth fund China Investment Corporation, and the Bank of China, all
owned by the Chinese government.51 The joint development agreement is
a nonbinding agreement to work towards developing a new pipeline in
Alaska to carry natural gas from Prudhoe Bay to a liquefaction plant in
43. Wang Guan, Alaska Eyes Stronger Engagement with China on Tourism, Gas,
CGTN (Sept. 18, 2017, 10:30 AM), https://news.cgtn.com/news/78677a4d35557a
6333566d54/share_p.html.
44. Elwood Brehmer, Explore Fairbanks Signs Deal on Gov’s China Trade Trip,
ALASKA J. OF COM. (May 30, 2018, 10:24 AM), http://www.alaskajournal.com
/2018-05-30/explore-fairbanks-signs-deal-govs-china-trade-trip#.W8jkFXtKiUk.
45. Id.
46. Alaska Businesses Selected for Opportunity Alaska: China Trade Mission, BILL
WALKER, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR (Apr. 18, 2018), https://gov.alaska.gov/
newsroom/2018/04/alaska-businesses-selected-for-opportunity-alaska-chinatrade-mission/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20181020183936/https://
gov.alaska.gov/newsroom/2018/04/alaska-businesses-selected-foropportunity-alaska-china-trade-mission/].
47. BILL WALKER, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, supra note 1.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Falsey, supra note 41.
51. Elwood Brehmer, AK LNG Leaders Navigate Trade Battle with China,
ALASKA J. OF COM. (July 18, 2018, 10:29 AM), http://www.alaskajournal.com/
2018-07-18/ak-lng-leaders-navigate-trade-battle-china#.W8jsYXtKiUk.
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southern Alaska, from which the LNG could be shipped overseas.52
Under the joint development agreement, Sinopec would receive 75% of
the LNG from the new pipeline in exchange for the Chinese Investment
Corporation and the Bank of China financing the $43 billion pipeline and
liquefaction plant project.53 While trade relations with China and the U.S.
federal government have deteriorated since the original joint
development agreement was signed in 2017, the Alaska Gasline
Development Corporation and three Chinese entities signed a
supplemental agreement on October 2, 2018, reaffirming their
“willingness to advance” the Alaska LNG Project.54
B. The Threat from China to U.S. National Security
As China and Alaska forge ahead in strengthening their economic
bond, the relationship between China and the U.S. federal government
continues to deteriorate.55 As discussed in the Introduction, Recorded
Future reported that Chinese government-linked hackers probed Alaska
state-owned computer servers for vulnerabilities following Governor
Walker’s trade mission to China in 2017.56 In 2015, then-U.S. president
Barack Obama and China’s President Xi reached a verbal agreement that,
among other things, China would stop hacking U.S. companies to
conduct economic espionage.57 Although the “Obama-Xi Agreement” did
not stop all Chinese hacking, “we witnessed about [a] 90% drop in
Chinese nation-state sponsored intrusions against [the] Western
52. Sean Maguire, BP Alaska Signs onto the Alaska LNG Project in a “Historic
Milestone”, KTUU (Sept. 10, 2018, 12:18 PM), https://www.ktuu.com/content
/news/Gas-line-corporation-BP-make-progress-on-Alaska-gas-deal481981671.html.
53. Ashley Feng & Sagatom Saha, China’s Arctic Ambitions in Alaska,
DIPLOMAT (Apr. 20, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/chinas-arcticambitions-in-alaska/.
54. China and Alaska Reaffirm Willingness to Advance Alaska LNG, ALASKA
GASLINE DEV. CORP. (Oct. 2, 2018), http://agdc.us/wp-content/uploads/
2018/10/Press-Release-China-and-Alaska-Reaffirm-Willingness-to-AdvanceAlaska-LNG.pdf. The Alaska Gasline Development Corporation has since
reaffirmed its intent to carry out the joint development agreement in the wake of
the latest friction between Washington and Beijing. Elwood Brehmer, Tariff Pause
Doesn’t Alter Talks with China on Alaska LNG, Officials Say, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS
(Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.adn.com/business-economy/2018/12/05/tariffpause-doesnt-alter-talks-with-china-on-alaska-lng-officials-say/.
55. Julian Borger & Lily Kuo, US-China Tensions Soar as ‘New Cold War’ Heats
Up, GUARDIAN (Oct. 16, 2018, 6:03 PM), https://www.theguardian.com
/world/2018/oct/16/us-china-new-cold-war-tensions.
56. Bing & Stubbs, supra note 6.
57. Robert Farley, Did the Obama-Xi Cyber Agreement Work?, DIPLOMAT (Aug.
11, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/did-the-obama-xi-cyber-agreement
-work/.
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commercial sector,” a few months after they reached the agreement.58 On
October 10, 2018, however, Dmitri Alperovitch, co-founder of preeminent
cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike,59 announced on Twitter that “China is
back (after a big dropoff in activity in 2016) to being the predominant
nation-state intrusion threat in terms of volume of activity against
Western industry.”60
Alperovitch’s statement followed the FBI’s arrest of Yanjun Xu, a
Chinese intelligence officer working for China’s Ministry of State
Security.61 Yanjun Xu was extradited from Belgium to the United States
on charges of economic espionage and theft of trade secrets from GE
Aviation and other American aerospace companies.62 While China’s
Ministry of State Security currently leads China’s international hacking
efforts,63 the Department of Justice alleges that Xu targeted experts who
worked at aerospace companies around the world and recruited these
experts to travel to China to conduct economic espionage and steal trade
secrets.64 This case joins countless other cases of Chinese operatives
conducting economic espionage of U.S. companies.65 As Assistant
Attorney General for the Department of Justice’s National Security
Division John Demers noted in announcing Xu’s arrest, “[t]his case is not
an isolated incident. It is part of an overall economic policy of developing
China at American expense,” often through illegal means.66
Trade and investment relations between China and the U.S. federal
government have become a battleground over the balance of trade, trade
in specific goods, and investment in specific businesses. As part of
President Trump’s “trade war,” the federal government has imposed 25%
tariffs on $250 billion worth of imports from China, which amount to
about half of the United States’ overall imports from China.67 The Trump

58. Borger & Kuo, supra note 55.
59. CrowdStrike, like Recorded Future, is a private firm providing cyber
threat intelligence to its clients, as well as conducting its own research into cyber
threat actors, such as China. CROWDSTRIKE, https://www.crowdstrike.com/ (last
visited Dec. 14, 2018).
60. Dmitri Alperovitch (@DAlperovitch), TWITTER (Oct. 10, 2018, 11:54 AM),
https://twitter.com/DAlperovitch/status/1050097354869788673.
61. Chinese Intelligence Officer Charged with Economic Espionage Involving Theft
of Trade Secrets from Leading U.S. Aviation Companies, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 10,
2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-intelligence-officer-chargedeconomic-espionage-involving-theft-trade-secrets-leading.
62. Id.
63. Alperovitch, supra note 60.
64. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 61.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Trump Slaps Tariffs on US$200b of Chinese Goods in Sharp Escalation of Trade
War, STRAITS TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018, 1:15 PM), https://www.straitstimes.com/
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administration has further threatened to impose tariffs on another $267
billion worth of Chinese imports.68 China, by contrast, has imposed 25%
tariffs on $110 billion worth of U.S. goods, out of the $130 billion worth of
goods China imports from the United States.69 China has also filed a
complaint with the World Trade Organization protesting the U.S. tariffs.70
Alaska itself has been caught up in the trade war, with China imposing a
25% tariff on Pacific Northwest seafood.71 This could have “devastating”
impacts on Alaska’s largest export to its largest trading partner.72
With specific exports to and investments from China, the federal
government has been especially concerned with high technology
developed in the United States. On the export side, the federal
government recently imposed export controls on forty-four Chinese
companies, allowing the federal government to control whether certain
technology is exported to those companies.73 U.S. Trade Representative
Robert Lighthizer explained that “China’s government is aggressively
working to undermine America’s hi-tech industries and our economic
leadership through unfair trade practices and industrial policies like
Made in China 2025.”74
On the investment side, U.S. policymakers have been concerned that
“China is weaponizing its investment in the U.S. to exploit national
security vulnerabilities, including the back-door transfer of dual-use U.S.
technology and related know-how, aiding China’s military
modernization and weakening the U.S. defense industrial base.”75 As of
2017, China has invested in 7–10% of American startup companies

world/united-states/trump-announces-10-tariffs-on-us200b-in-chinese-goodsfrom-sept-24.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Donald Trump’s Many Trade Wars: A Summary, STRAITS TIMES (Sept. 18,
2018, 8:33 AM), https://www.straitstimes.com/world/united-states/donaldtrumps-many-trade-wars-a-summary.
71. Yereth Rosen, Alaska Seafood Industry Braces for China Tariff Pain, REUTERS
(Aug. 12, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-chinaalaska/alaska-seafood-industry-braces-for-china-tariff-pain-idUSKBN1KX0CQ.
72. Id. (“‘This isn’t an easily replaced market,’ [Frances Leach, executive
director of Alaska’s largest commercial fishing trade group] said, ‘[w]hat’s going
to happen is China is just going to stop buying Alaska fish.’”).
73. Sarah Zheng, U.S. Slaps Export Controls on Dozens of Chinese Firms Over
‘Threat to National Security’ as Trade Tensions Escalate, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
(Aug. 2, 2018, 1:10 PM), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacydefence/article/2157932/us-slaps-export-controls-dozens-chinese-firms-over.
74. Id.
75. Jonathan Wakely & Andrew Indorf, Managing National Security Risk in an
Open Economy: Reforming the Committee on Foreign Investment, 9 HARV. NAT’L SEC.
L.J. 1, 26 (2018), http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/
WakelyIndorf_CFIUS_05.28.18.pdf.
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through venture capital financing and is specifically investing in startups
expected to be “foundational to future innovation in the U.S.: artificial
intelligence, autonomous vehicles, augmented/virtual reality, robotics
and blockchain technology.”76 These concerns drove Congress in August
2018 to pass the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act,
which will strengthen the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States (CFIUS).77
Alaska’s economic relationship with China is thus set against this
increasingly contentious relationship between the U.S. federal
government and China. While the federal government has not yet
intervened to block or regulate any of Alaska’s direct relations with the
Chinese government, the U.S. has begun to do so in Israel, where the
federal government has pressured the Israeli government to curtail its
economic relationship with China based on national security concerns.78
Like the China-Alaska relationship, Israel’s mutually beneficial
relationship with China has grown in recent years.79 Further, like Alaska,
Israel has embraced increased Chinese investments in local industries and
increased Israeli exports to China.80 While Israel is not a state like Alaska,
this situation nonetheless evidences the U.S. federal government’s

76. MICHAEL BROWN & PAVNEET SINGH, DEFENSE INNOVATION UNIT
EXPERIMENTAL, CHINA’S TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER STRATEGY: HOW CHINESE
INVESTMENTS IN EMERGING TECHNOLOGY ENABLE A STRATEGIC COMPETITOR TO
ACCESS THE CROWN JEWELS OF U.S. INNOVATION 2 (2018), https://admin.govexec
.com/media/diux_chinatechnologytransferstudy_jan_2018_(1).pdf.
77. Mercy A. Kuo, CFIUS and China: The FIRRMA Factor, DIPLOMAT (Oct. 17,
2018),
https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/cfius-and-china-the-firrma-factor/.
CFIUS is an interagency group chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury which is
empowered to block or mitigate corporate transactions that may lead to foreign
control of American businesses implicating U.S. national security. Wakely &
Indorf, supra note 75, at 7. President Trump recently blocked an attempted
Chinese takeover of a U.S. semiconductor manufacturer on the recommendation
of CFIUS. Seth Fiegerman & Jackie Wattles, Trump Stops China-Backed Takeover of
U.S. Chip Maker, CNN (Sept. 14, 2017, 12:47 AM), https://money.cnn.com/
2017/09/13/technology/business/trump-lattice-china/index.html. China itself
has begun to respond to the U.S. federal government’s increasing vigilance
against Chinese investment by blocking U.S. chipmaker Qualcomm’s purchase of
Dutch chipmaker NXP. Don Clark, Qualcomm Scraps $44 Billion NXP After China
Inaction, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/25/
technology/qualcomm-nxp-china-deadline.html.
78. David Rosenberg, Israel Will Have to Choose Between America and China,
HAARETZ (Jan. 8, 2019, 3:31 PM), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.
premium-israel-will-have-to-choose-between-america-and-china-1.6822921.
79. Omree Wechsler, Caught Between Giants: How Will Israel Navigate the U.S.China Tech Cold War?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Feb. 5, 2019),
https://www.cfr.org/blog/caught-between-giants-how-will-israel-navigate-uschina-tech-cold-war.
80. Id.
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willingness to intervene in the economic relations between two other
sovereigns to protect national security.
The Alaska LNG Project, moreover, has become a bargaining chip in
ongoing U.S.-China trade discussions.81 The project has been seen as an
“olive branch” in trade talks between the U.S. federal government and
China,82 but it could be destroyed if trade relations continue to deteriorate
or concerns about Chinese involvement in energy projects increase.
Energy, as critical infrastructure, is both a part of China’s “Made in China
2025” initiative83 and subject to CFIUS oversight as part of its mandate to
protect U.S. national security.84 Congress’s passage of the Foreign
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 was a direct response
to the perceived threat of Chinese investment and was intended to give
CFIUS greater power to scrutinize such transactions.85
As the LNG project progresses and Alaska’s economic ties with
China grow stronger, the U.S. federal government may begin to pressure
Alaska in the same way that it has pressured Israel to reduce ties with
China. Alaska’s interests in the LNG project are thus on a potential
collision course with the U.S. federal government’s interest in protecting
U.S. national security. This situation makes the anti-commandeering
doctrine especially relevant because it prevents the federal government
from forcing Alaska to act, requiring instead that the federal government
itself regulate or block the LNG project, for example, to accomplish its
national security goals.

III. A LONG HISTORY OF STATE INVOLVEMENT IN FOREIGN
COMMERCE
The current tension between Alaska, China, and the United States
hardly represents the first time that a state’s interest in foreign commerce
has run counter to the interests of the federal government. The conflict
between the commercial interests of the individual states and the nation
as a whole under the Articles of Confederation in large part led to the
adoption of the U.S. Constitution in 1788, drafted to empower the federal
government to exert greater control over foreign affairs and foreign

81. Yereth Rosen, Alaska Officials Still Bullish on China Nat Gas Partnership,
REUTERS (July 11, 2018, 10:14 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chinalng-alaska/alaska-officials-still-bullish-on-china-nat-gas-partnershipidUSKBN1K2060.
82. Id.
83. Scott Kennedy, Made in China 2025, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES
(June 1, 2015), https://www.csis.org/analysis/made-china-2025.
84. 50 U.S.C. § 4565 (2018).
85. Kuo, supra note 77.
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commerce.86 Despite this constitutional intent, the states have continued
to participate in foreign commerce even when the states’ interests conflict
with those of the federal government. To provide context, this Section will
address several key episodes in U.S. history that demonstrate the states’
ongoing roles in foreign commerce. It will also describe the relatively
recent reemergence of the states’ roles in foreign commerce as a response
to globalization.87 This balance of power protects Alaska’s full-throated
advocacy of its economic stake in the LNG project and would require the
federal government to expend costly political capital to scuttle the project
directly.
A. The Embargo Act of 1807
The events surrounding the implementation of the Embargo Act of
1807 and its effects in the United States elucidate the relationship between
the states and the federal government with regard to foreign commerce
in the early Republic. In 1803, the Peace of Amiens dissolved and Britain
and France resumed their war against each other.88 Beginning in 1803, as
part of the war effort, Britain began the practice of impressment of
American sailors, which involved stopping U.S. ships in international
waters and forcing American sailors to join the Royal Navy.89 The
Chesapeake-Leopard affair, in which the HMS Leopard attacked and boarded
the unsuspecting USS Chesapeake, nearly brought Britain and the United
States to war in 1807.90
Later that year, Britain instituted a wartime policy requiring all U.S.
ships to pass through Britain and obtain a license to trade with Europe,
effectively blockading Europe.91 France responded by ordering that any
ship securing a British license to trade would be seized.92 Thus, U.S. ships
could no longer trade across the Atlantic without being seized by either
Britain or France.93 U.S. President Thomas Jefferson and Congress
responded by enacting the Embargo Act of 1807, which prohibited all U.S.
ships from leaving port to trade with foreign countries.94 The Act’s goal

86. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 1–2.
87. This Note considers “globalization” to be the growing interconnectedness
and interdependence of world economies and economic activities, including
trade, investment, and tourism, across national borders.
88. GEORGE C. HERRING, FROM COLONY TO SUPERPOWER: U.S. FOREIGN
RELATIONS SINCE 1776, at 114 (2008).
89. Id. at 117.
90. Id. at 118.
91. Id. at 119.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. LOUIS MARTIN SEARS, JEFFERSON AND THE EMBARGO 59–60 (1927).
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was to protect American ships and coerce Britain and France to rescind
their wartime policies through a single, coherent American stance.95
At the time of the embargo, the United States had been exporting one
million tons of goods overseas.96 Of this total, Massachusetts controlled
about one-third, equaling an estimated $38.2 million in 1807.97 In New
England, “[n]ot only would shipowners and their dependent seaman face
severe loss and privation, but [sic] farmers would be deprived of their
customary market for lumber and potash, butter, grain, etc. . . . .”98 New
England vigorously opposed the embargo to protect its economic
relationship with Europe, especially Britain.99 As President Jefferson
lamented,
the ascendancy which Great Britain exercises over us through. . .
her omnipotence over our Commercial men, is most deplorable.
In the existing difficulties she has proved that these
circumstances aided by her intrigues and money have enabled
her to shake our Union to its center, to control its legislative and
Executive authorities, to force them from the measures which
their judgment would have approved . . . .100
Of importance to the anti-commandeering doctrine, President
Jefferson at first did not require the states to enforce the embargo.101
Instead, Jefferson sent letters to the governors of Georgia, the Territory of
Orleans, South Carolina, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, merely
requesting that they help enforce the embargo.102 As economic conditions
worsened in New England and the Mid-Atlantic states, the state
governments began publicly rejecting the federal government’s power to
require their enforcement of the embargo.103 Massachusetts, Connecticut,
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New York

95. Id.
96. Id. at 145.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 298. (“American commerce had long been the mainstay of British
foreign exchange. Under normal conditions, the direct American trade supplied
Great Britain with cotton, lumber, flax, and tobacco. But America was still more
important as a market, and the balance of trade was high in favor of Great
Britain.”).
100. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Alexander McRae (Feb. 8, 1809),
https://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=FOEA-print04-01-02-9746.
101. Dennis James Palumbo, The States and American Foreign Relations 40–
41 (1960) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with
author).
102. Id. at 41.
103. Id. at 43–46.
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all passed resolutions refusing to enforce the embargo on the basis of state
sovereignty.104
The Connecticut General Assembly’s proclamation regarding the
Embargo Act drew important distinctions with regard to the Act’s
enforceability:
The members of the General Assembly . . . have . . . decided, that
in such a crisis of affairs, it is right, and has become the duty of
the legislative and executive authorities in the State, to withhold
their aid, and co-operation from the execution of the act, passed
to enforce more effectually the embargo system. . . . While it is
the duty of the Legislature to guard the sovereignty of the State,
and your rights from encroachment, it continues to be your duty,
as peaceable citizens, to abstain from all resistance, against acts,
which purport to be laws of the United States. Be advised to seek
none but constitutional relief.105
Connecticut did not declare the embargo itself unconstitutional, nor
did Connecticut tell its citizens that they could disregard the embargo.
Instead, the Connecticut General Assembly explained that the state
government itself could not be compelled to enforce the federal law, even
though the Embargo Act regulated Connecticut’s citizens individually.
The Connecticut state government refused to allow the federal
government to commandeer it. In 1809, under mounting pressure from
the states, Congress voted to repeal the Embargo Act.106
This episode from the early Republic demonstrates two key points.
First, the states played significant roles in foreign commerce at the
country’s founding, when the Framers of the U.S. Constitution staked out
the sovereign powers of the states and the federal government. Second,
while the federal government could regulate the flow of goods in foreign
commerce through the embargo, the states retained—at least in their
view107 and in their practice108—a measure of sovereignty. While the

104. Id.
105. SEARS, supra note 94, at 185–86.
106. Id. at 46–47. The Embargo Act was replaced with a non-intercourse act
which only barred trade with Britain and France, allowing American ships to
leave U.S. ports for other foreign countries. Id. at 47. The non-intercourse act,
however, was easily circumvented by U.S. ships and thus did not raise the same
protests between New England and the Mid-Atlantic states. Id.
107. SEARS, supra note 94, at 185–86. Recall the Connecticut General Assembly’s
proclamation discussed in the preceding paragraph.
108. Palumbo, supra note 101, at 43–46. Recall that Massachusetts, Connecticut,
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New York all
refused to enforce the Embargo Act as an unconstitutional violation of state
sovereignty.
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federal government could enact its own foreign economic policy, it could
not make the states its agents in implementing that policy.
B. From the Early Republic to the Modern Era109
The Embargo Act failed to influence the wartime economic policies
of Britain and France110 and irreparably harmed U.S. shipping interests by
preventing trade with Latin America, allowing Britain to monopolize the
market.111 The Embargo Act, however, spurred the growth of
manufacturing in the United States.112 Further, westward expansion in
North America opened new domestic markets to U.S. commercial
interests, reducing the need to export and import goods from overseas.113
Following the U.S. Civil War, the U.S. federal government became the
“predominant force” in U.S. foreign policy.114 World Wars I and II and the
Cold War further solidified this position.115
C. The Reemergence of the States in Foreign Commerce
In the 1960s and 1970s, the states became more involved in foreign
commerce.116 This reemergence began with North Carolina Governor
Luther Hodges’s trade mission to Europe in 1959.117 Governor Hodges led
a delegation to Western Europe seeking foreign direct investment in
North Carolina and “explored potential economic opportunities in the
Soviet Union.”118 In 1969, Virginia placed a trade officer in Brussels in an
attempt to attract European business to the state.119 Jimmy Carter, as
governor of Georgia from 1971 to 1975, estimated that he spent nearly one
quarter of his time in office promoting Georgia’s exports and soliciting
investment in the state from overseas.120 By 1986, the states had opened
sixty-six trade offices overseas.121 By 1994, that number had grown to 162
109. This Section necessarily glosses over roughly 150 years of U.S. history. As
this Note is not a treatise on U.S. commercial history, this Section will simply
describe several key points about the time period between the early Republic and
the reemergence of the states in foreign commerce in the 1950s.
110. HERRING, supra note 88, at 119–21.
111. SEARS, supra note 94, at 192.
112. Id. at 197.
113. Palumbo, supra note 101, at 98.
114. FRY, supra note 14, at 58.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 67–69 (discussing the increase in the number of states seeking
involvement in international business).
117. Id. at 67.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 68.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 69 tbl.4.1.
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offices.122 In 1993, governors from twenty-seven U.S. states and territories
sent eighty-one trade and investment missions abroad.123
Currently, forty states operate a total of 199 trade offices abroad.124
China is the most popular country in which states open trade offices,
where states currently operate twenty-seven such offices.125 Moreover,
nearly every state has a home office devoted to promoting trade abroad.126
These trade offices facilitate trade missions and trade shows and counsel
local businesses on exporting goods.127 Most of these trade offices are also
responsible for soliciting foreign direct investment in their states.128
Further, states have entered into over 340 agreements with foreign
countries and political sub-units.129 The states have entered into sixty-one
agreements with China or Chinese political sub-units, the second most
after Canada.130 Overall, the states have entered into at least 128
agreements that concern trade and technology.131 Alaska’s joint
development agreement with China to develop the liquid natural gas
project represents just one of these agreements. Alaska also entered into
a memorandum of understanding with Taiwan, in which Alaska agreed
to expand development of its coal production in return for Taiwanese
state-owned energy companies purchasing the coal produced.132
While most of the states’ promotion of economic engagement abroad
comports with the U.S. federal government’s interests, a few notable
instances show where these interests may conflict. In the late 1970s, the
regime of Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya sought the help of U.S.
politicians from Idaho to re-open a deal to sell C-130 troop-transport
planes to the Libyan government that the State Department had
blocked.133 The Qaddafi regime hosted Idaho farmers, businessmen, and
even a U.S. senator in Libya, and Colonel Qaddafi himself met with
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Jennifer Burnett, Beyond Borders: State International Trade Offices, THE
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, http://www.csg.org/pubs/capitolideas/2015_nov
_dec/beyond_borders.aspx (last visited Dec. 14, 2018).
125. Id.
126. FRY, supra note 14, at 72.
127. STATE INT’L DEV. ORG., SIDO WASH. FORUM 2018 (2018), http://knowledge
center.csg.org/kc/system/files/2018%20SIDO%20Washington%20Binder%20K
C.pdf.
128. Id.
129. Hollis, supra note 17, at 750.
130. Id. at 753 fig.3.
131. Id. at 755 fig.4.
132. Memorandum of Understanding Between the State of Alaska and the
Ministry of Econ. Affairs of China, Alaska-U.S.-China., Sept. 16, 2004,
http://www.secinfo.com/d14D5a.15Z75.b.htm.
133. William Safire, Libya and Idaho, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 1979),
https://www.nytimes.com/1979/02/15/archives/essay-libya-and-idaho.html.

KARSON - V6.1 (FINAL VERSION) (DO NOT DELETE)

2019

CAUGHT BETWEEN SUPERPOWERS

5/19/2019 11:34 AM

65

Idaho’s congressman Representative Steven Symms.134 The trade talks
between Idaho and Libya reportedly led to $30 million in wheat deals, but
Libya never received the planes.135
In 2003, Kansas governor Kathleen Sebelius reached an agreement
with Cuba’s food trade agency that Cuba would purchase $10 million
worth of Kansas agricultural products in exchange for Kansas advocating
for the removal of federal trade and travel sanctions against Cuba.136 In
2005, Kansas’s lieutenant governor announced the sale of $3 million
worth of wheat to Cuba and his support for a bill introduced by a Kansas
congressman in the U.S. House of Representatives to repeal sanctions
against Cuba.137 The bill, however, went nowhere.138 Nevertheless,
interest groups in Kansas and members of Kansas’s congressional
delegation continue to advocate for trade with Cuba.139

IV. FEDERAL POWER OVER FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTICOMMANDEERING DOCTRINE
Due to the states’ increasing role in foreign commerce, state and
federal policies regarding China are on a potential collision course. Thus,
it is important to understand what constitutional and statutory power the
federal government has to control foreign commerce. This Section will
first discuss these powers over foreign commerce. This Section will then
describe the anti-commandeering doctrine and how it may protect certain
state activities in foreign commerce from federal control.
A. Federal Power to Control Foreign Commerce
The Supreme Court’s doctrinal view, which has been criticized as
legally unsound and ignorant of the states’ and the federal government’s
historical practice,140 has long been that the federal government exercises
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Hollis, supra note 17, at 741.
137. Id. at 741 n.4.
138. Id. at 741 n.3.
139. Engage Cuba & Kansas Farmers Launch State Council to Lift the Cuban
Embargo, ENGAGE CUBA COALITION (Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.engagecuba.org
/press-releases/2016/9/19/engage-cuba-kansas-farmers-launch-state-councilto-lift-the-cuban-embargo?rq=kansas (citing support from Kansas’s two U.S.
senators and a past chairman of the Kansas Wheat Commission).
140. See Cleveland, supra note 20, at 975 (“The ‘one-voice’ doctrine is a myth.
It finds little support in the constitutional framework, which divides foreign
relations powers among the three federal branches, and even less in the practice
of government.”); David H. Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98 MINN. L. REV. 953, 954
(2014) (“[W]hile the doctrine partially captures constitutional principles, it is in
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total control over foreign affairs and may prohibit state participation
therein.141 In 1840, the Court explained, “It was the main object of the
Constitution to make us, so far as regarded our foreign relations, one
people, one nation.”142 In 1937, the Court reiterated, “[I]n respect of our
foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purposes, the
state . . . does not exist.”143 In 1942, the Court stated, “Power over external
affairs is not shared with the States; it is vested in the national government
exclusively.”144
This principle of exclusive federal control over foreign affairs is
known as the “one-voice” doctrine.145 The one-voice doctrine does not
accurately describe the state of affairs in U.S. foreign relations, either
historically or currently. Moreover, scholars have frequently asserted that
the one-voice doctrine conflicts with the text of the Constitution and the
constitutional principles of the separation of powers and federalism.146
The text of the Constitution and Congress’s actual enactments provide a
more accurate picture of federal power over foreign commerce.
Textually, Congress is empowered to regulate commerce with
foreign nations147 and to give advice and consent on treaties,148 among
other powers relating to foreign affairs. The Constitution grants the
President the powers to make treaties,149 appoint ambassadors,150 receive
ambassadors,151 and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.152 The
Constitution also explicitly prohibits the states from entering into “any
treaty, alliance, or confederation”153 and requires Congress’s consent
before a state may “enter into any agreement or compact . . . with a
foreign power.”154 Nevertheless, the Constitution does not grant the

key respects inconsistent with constitutional text, structure, and history.”).
141. GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 18, at xviii–xix.
142. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 575 (1840).
143. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
144. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942).
145. See Zivitofsky ex rel. Zivitofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 214 (2012)
(“[W]here foreign affairs is at issue, the practical need for the United States to
speak ‘with one voice and ac[t] as one,’ is particularly important.”).
146. See Cleveland, supra note 20, at 975; Moore, supra note 140 at 991–99.
147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
148. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id., § 3.
152. Id.
153. Id. art. I, § 10.
154. Id. The Court has interpreted the Compacts Clause to require
congressional approval of compacts or agreements where the compact or
agreement encroaches on federal supremacy. New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S.
363, 369 (1976). Yet, the Supreme Court has only ever reviewed one alleged
compact between a state and a foreign country, despite the existence of over 340
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federal government a blanket “foreign affairs power” and does not
prohibit the states from promoting their economic relations with foreign
countries. Moreover, the Tenth Amendment to the Bill of Rights reserves
to the states all powers not specifically granted to the federal
government.155
Congress has enacted several statutory schemes under its
constitutional powers to control foreign commerce for national security
reasons. First, under the Exon-Florio Act and subsequent legislation,
CFIUS has jurisdiction to review foreign direct investment in the United
States that results in foreign control of a U.S. business.156 CFIUS may
“enter into or impose, and enforce any agreement or condition with any
party to the covered transaction in order to mitigate any threat to the
national security of the United States that arises as a result of the . . .
transaction.”157 Second, under the Export Administration Regulations
(EAR), the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security
has authority to control the export of “any goods or technology” the
export of which would “prove detrimental” to U.S. national security.158
Finally, under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), the
State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls has the
authority to control the export or import of weapons.159
Outside of Congress’s powers to control foreign commerce, the
Supreme Court has developed its own doctrines regarding state
participation in foreign commerce. Chief among these doctrines is the
agreements between states and foreign countries. Hollis, supra note 17, at 779.
155. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
156. Wakely & Indorf, supra note 75, at 7–9.
157. Id. at 9 (internal quotations omitted).
158. Id. at 11. The EAR include a list of goods that may only be exported subject
to licensing by the Department of Commerce. Id. at 11–12. These goods are
typically “dual-use” goods, meaning that they “have both commercial and
military” applications. Id. at 12 (internal quotations omitted). Such goods include
nuclear materials, electronics, and avionics, among others. Id. The EAR also
include a list of countries to whom exporting requires a special license. Id.
Congress recently passed the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, which
authorizes the Department of Commerce to identify “emerging” and
“foundational” technologies to add to the EAR list. Commerce Requests Comment
on Criteria for Identifying Emerging Technologies That Are Essential to U.S. National
Security, COVINGTON & BURLING (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.cov.com//media/files/corporate/publications/2018/11/commerce_requests_comment_
on_criteria_for_identifying_emerging_technologies_that_are_essential_to_us_na
tional_security.pdf. The Department of Commerce is considering adding
technology categories including biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and
robotics. Id.
159. Wakely & Indorf, supra note 75, at 12–13. Under the ITAR, the State
Department maintains a list of weapons that require a license to export. Id. This
list also includes defense services and technical data related to listed weapons. Id.
at 13.
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dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. Early in the 19th century, the Court
ruled that the states may not impose burdensome regulations on foreign
commerce even where Congress has not passed relevant legislation.160
Here, however, Alaska is not regulating foreign commerce, but instead
seeking to promote it. More relevant, then, is the Supremacy Clause,
under which a federal statute, treaty, or congressional-executive
agreement may displace conflicting state law that affects foreign
commerce.161 For example, if Alaska passed its own export regulations,
those regulations would be unconstitutional to the extent that they
conflicted with the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Export
Administration Regulations. This Note, however, argues that the anticommandeering doctrine protects Alaska’s promotion of its economic
relationship with China, as opposed to its regulation thereof. The
principal distinction between regulation and promotion is that, in
promoting foreign commerce, Alaska acts as a political representative of
its citizens, whereas, in regulating foreign commerce, Alaska would enact
and enforce the law.
B. The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine
The anti-commandeering doctrine delineates the outer bounds of
Congress’s constitutional powers.162 Thus, while Congress has broad
powers to regulate foreign commerce,163 the anti-commandeering
doctrine recognizes that those powers have limits.164 Congress does not
have the power “to issue direct orders to the governments of the
States.”165 The anti-commandeering doctrine enforces the respective
sovereignties of the federal government and the states, with the federal
government possessing the powers enumerated in the Constitution and
all residual powers reserved to the states.166 The anti-commandeering
doctrine, moreover, reflects the constitutional structure in which the
federal government and the state governments regulate individuals, but
in which the federal government does not regulate the state governments
themselves as it had under the Articles of Confederation.167
The Supreme Court first developed the anti-commandeering
doctrine in New York v. United States.168 New York involved a federal
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
See generally Amer. Ins. Assoc. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1475–76 (2018).
See supra Section IV.A.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476.
Id.
Id. at 1475.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
Id.
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statute that required states to provide for the disposal of low-level
radioactive waste generated within their borders or to take title to that
waste and become liable for any damages resulting from the failure to
dispose of it.169 The Court ruled that this provision commandeered the
state legislatures in violation of the anti-commandeering doctrine.170 The
Court reasoned that
[T]he Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon
Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States . . . . We
have always understood that even where Congress has the
authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or
prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the
States to require or prohibit those acts.171
In other words, Congress may directly regulate individuals, but Congress
may not force the states to regulate individuals.
In Printz v. United States,172 the Court expanded the anticommandeering doctrine to apply not only to state legislatures, but also
to state executive officials.173 Printz concerned a federal law that required
local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on handgun
purchasers.174 The Court ruled that, under the anti-commandeering
doctrine, “[t]he Federal Government may neither issue directives
requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the
States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or
enforce a federal regulatory program.”175 The Court cited the absence in
the historical record of federal statutes imposing obligations on state
officials as support for the anti-commandeering doctrine.176 Thus, where
Congress could not force state legislatures to enact policies, neither could
it force state executive officials to enforce federal policies.
Most recently, in Murphy v. NCAA,177 the Court expanded the anticommandeering doctrine to apply to negative prohibitions on state
actions.178 In Murphy, the Court addressed a federal statute that
prohibited state legislatures from authorizing sports gambling.179 The
Court reasoned that “[i]t was a matter of happenstance that the laws

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 174–75.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 166.
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Id. at 928.
Id. at 902–04.
Id. at 935.
Id. at 907–08.
138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
Id. at 1478.
Id. at 1468.
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challenged in New York and Printz commanded ‘affirmative’ action as
opposed to imposing a prohibition. The basic principle—that Congress
cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures—applies in either event.”180
Congress may neither force a state legislature to enact a certain policy, nor
may Congress prohibit a state legislature from enacting a certain policy.
Under the Court’s jurisprudence, the anti-commandeering doctrine
reflects three principles of the Constitution’s structure of dualsovereignty. First, divided sovereignty between the federal and state
governments promotes the liberty of individuals.181 Second, the anticommandeering doctrine promotes political accountability, so that
“[v]oters who like or dislike the effects of regulation know who to credit
and who to blame” for that regulation.182 And third, the anticommandeering doctrine “prevents Congress from shifting the costs of
regulation to the States” from the federal government.183 The Court uses
these principles to help determine where the anti-commandeering
doctrine applies.184 Therefore, where a statute conflicts with these
principles, the anti-commandeering doctrine is more likely to apply.
The anti-commandeering doctrine has important limits. Reno v.
Condon185 involved a statute prohibiting states from disclosing certain
information collected through driver’s license applications.186 South
Carolina challenged the statute as violating the anti-commandeering
doctrine because it directed the states not to take a certain action.187 The
Supreme Court nevertheless ruled that, where a federal statute “does not
require the States in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own
citizens,” Congress does not violate the anti-commandeering doctrine.188
The Court thus concluded that the anti-commandeering doctrine did not
prevent Congress from prohibiting states from disclosing information
collected through driver’s license applications.189 Condon may thus

180. Id. at 1478.
181. Id. at 1477 (“A healthy balance of power between the States and the
Federal Government reduces the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.”)
(quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181–82 (1992)).
182. Id. at 1477 (“By contrast, if a State imposes regulations only because it has
been commanded to do so by Congress, responsibility is blurred.”).
183. Id. (“If Congress enacts a law and requires enforcement by the Executive
Branch, it must appropriate the funds needed to administer the program. It is
pressured to weight the expected benefits of the program against its costs. But if
Congress can compel the States to enact and enforce its program, Congress need
not engage in any such analysis.”).
184. See id.
185. 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 147.
188. Id. at 151.
189. Id.
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suggest that the anti-commandeering doctrine does not apply where the
state is not regulating its citizens.
The Court, moreover, has ruled that Congress may regulate state
bond issuance, reasoning that such regulation does not “seek to control
or influence the manner in which States regulate private parties.”190 The
Court in Murphy affirmed that “even if [the bond regulation] was
tantamount to an outright prohibition of the issuance of bearer bonds . . .
the law would simply treat state bonds the same as private bonds. The
anti-commandeering doctrine does not apply when Congress
evenhandedly regulates an activity in which the States and private actors
engage.”191 Thus, the anti-commandeering doctrine does not prohibit
federal statutes that regulate state governments in the same way that
Congress normally regulates private individuals.
The question is thus whether the anti-commandeering doctrine
protects a state’s promotion of its economic relationship with a foreign
country as within the state’s residual sovereignty or whether the
regulation of a state’s economic relationship would simply be Congress’s
permissible regulation of a state as a private party.
C. The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine Would Likely Protect Alaska’s
Promotion of its Economic Relationship with China
Whether the anti-commandeering doctrine applies in a particular
instance involves two complementary inquiries.192 First, whether the
Constitution has authorized Congress to act.193 And, second, whether
Congress’s action “invades the province of state sovereignty reserved by
the Tenth Amendment.”194 Regarding the first inquiry, the Supreme
Court has held that the Constitution does not authorize Congress to issue
direct orders to state governments.195 Here, a federal statute prohibiting
the government of Alaska from promoting its economic relationship with
China through trade missions and other intergovernmental relations with

190. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514–15 (1988).
191. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018).
192. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1997). The Court in New York
explained that these two inquiries were “mirror images of each other,” meaning
that, if Congress did not have the constitutional authority to act, Congress would
necessarily invade a state’s sovereignty. Id. at 156. This analysis was refined in
Condon, however, in which the Court explained that Congress may regulate state
governments directly so long as Congress regulates states as private actors rather
than in the states’ sovereign capacity. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000).
193. New York, 505 U.S. at 155.
194. Id.
195. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476.
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the Chinese government would constitute a direct order to the
government of Alaska.196
Regarding the second inquiry, the Supreme Court has held that a
state acts in its sovereign capacity for the purposes of the anticommandeering doctrine when the state regulates its citizens.197 The
Court has not held, however, that a state only acts in its sovereign capacity
when it regulates its citizens.198 Indeed, the Court has recognized that a
state may act in its sovereign capacity when it protects “public or
governmental interests that concern the state as a whole,” including
“when the ‘substantial impairment of the health and prosperity of the
towns and cities of the state’ are at stake.”199 This aspect of state
sovereignty is referred to as “parens patriae.”200 Notably, the Court has
recognized that a state may act as parens patriae to protect the commercial
interests of its citizens.201 The Court described the state’s role as parens
patriae as the “trustee, guardian, or representative of all her citizens.”202
While the Court has not had the opportunity to rule on whether a
state acting as parens patriae satisfies the second inquiry under the anticommandeering doctrine, this Note argues that it would satisfy the
inquiry here. The Supreme Court’s historical and policy rationales
underlying its application of the anti-commandeering doctrine in
previous cases support the doctrine’s protection of Alaska’s role as parens
patriae in the context of its economic relationship with China. The state of
Alaska acts as parens patriae when it promotes its economic relationship
with China on behalf of its citizens, protecting the wealth and prosperity
of the state as a whole. To require the Alaska state government to enforce
the federal government’s policy of non-intercourse with China would

196. See id. at 1478 (holding that the anti-commandeering doctrine applies
where Congress imposes a prohibition on a state’s action).
197. See id. at 1479 (describing the states’ regulation of their own citizens as the
states’ “sovereign authority”).
198. See New York, 505 U.S. at 155 (explaining that the determination hinges on
“state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment,” without limiting the
sovereignty determination to whether a state is regulating its own citizens).
199. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 n.17 (2007) (citing Missouri v.
Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 240–41 (1901)).
200. Id. at 520 n.17. Parens patriae, literally meaning “parent of his or her
country,” refers to the state in its sovereign capacity as protecting its citizens.
Parens patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
201. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 19 (1900); see also Alfred L. Snapp & Son v.
P.R., 458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982) (explaining that the Louisiana Court “labeled
Louisiana’s interest in the litigation as that of parens patriae”). The Court ultimately
dismissed the suit because Louisiana’s dispute was with the Texas health officer
rather than Texas itself, thus falling outside of the Court’s original jurisdiction. Id.
at 22–23.
202. Louisiana, 176 U.S. at 19.
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thus vitiate Alaska’s sovereign prerogative to represent its citizens in
violation of the anti-commandeering doctrine.
Historical practice also supports the anti-commandeering doctrine’s
protection of Alaska’s economic relationship with China from federal
interference. According to the Court in Printz, “early congressional
enactments provide contemporaneous and weighty evidence of the
Constitution’s meaning. Indeed, such contemporaneous legislative
exposition of the Constitution, acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes
the construction to be given its provisions.”203 In the events surrounding
the Embargo Act of 1807, President Jefferson did not initially demand that
the states enforce the Embargo Act on behalf of the federal government,
but instead requested that certain state governments do so.204 When the
President did demand that the states enforce the Act, the states declared
such demands unconstitutional.205 Thus, Congress could require that
individual citizens obey the Embargo Act, but Congress could not require
the state governments to enforce the Act on its behalf.206 Indeed, the anticommandeering doctrine polices the line between federal and state
sovereignty, apportioning political accountability between the two
sovereigns, rather than entirely prohibiting the federal government from
achieving its ultimate policy goal.
The balance of power between the federal government and the states
resulting from the Embargo Act episode represents an early
understanding of the federal government’s and the states’ dual
sovereignty. At the dawn of the Republic, the federal government could
not force the states to enforce federal economic policy and the states were
free to politically advocate their own economic policies.207 Indeed, the
federal government has acquiesced to this balance of power at least since
the late 1950s as the states’ roles in foreign commerce have reemerged.208
The federal government has not attempted to regulate the states’
economic relationships with foreign sovereigns, even where those
relationships are directly at odds with federal foreign policy.209 This
acquiescence, both in the early Republic and over the last 60 years,

203. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (internal brackets
removed).
204. See supra Section III.A.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See supra Section III.C.
209. See id. (describing relations between Idaho and the Qaddafi regime and
between Kansas and Cuba); see also Hollis, supra note 17, at 2 (“Kansas’s agreement
received no constitutional scrutiny whatsoever. Congress did not disavow the
deal. The Executive did nothing to oppose it.”).
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supports a constitutional construction that protects the states’ roles in
foreign commerce.
Alaska’s economic relationship with China also promotes the three
principles of dual sovereignty that underlie the anti-commandeering
doctrine.210 First, the anti-commandeering doctrine promotes Alaskans’
economic freedom by protecting the state government’s role in advancing
economic ties with China. Second, a federal statute prohibiting Alaska
from promoting an economic relationship with China would blur political
accountability for the success (or failure) of Alaska’s economy. Alaskan
exports to China bring nearly $5 billion into the state,211 supporting over
6000 jobs.212 The state government’s efforts to promote Alaskan exports—
by conducting trade missions and hosting Chinese government officials
in the state—are presumably responsible for much of this success. When
federal regulations harm Alaskan exports, as when the Trump
administration’s tariffs on China trigger retaliatory measures,213 the
citizens of Alaska know whom to blame—the federal government—and
may take appropriate action by voting federal policymakers out of
office.214 However, if the federal government prohibits the Alaskan
government from conducting trade missions and promoting Alaskan
exports, the political burden may shift to Alaskan policymakers, who
would not be responsible for their own inaction. While one might argue
that the citizens of Alaska will still know to blame the federal government
and could still vote federal policymakers out of office, the Supreme Court
has accepted this rationale as underpinning its anti-commandeering
decisions.215
Furthermore, a federal statute barring Alaska’s promotion of its
economic relationship with China would improperly shift the cost of
regulation from the federal government to Alaska. In much the same way
that a prohibition on economic relations between Alaska and China
would impose political costs, so too would such a prohibition impose
monetary costs. Not only would the state, and therefore its citizens, lose
tax dollars, but Alaska would also be responsible for the harm to its
overall economy. For example, where the federal government, through
the Trump administration’s trade war, has cost farmers in the Midwest
210. See supra text accompanying notes 181–184.
211. THE US-CHINA BUSINESS COUNCIL, supra note 34.
212. Id.
213. Rosen, supra note 71.
214. See Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1477 (2018) (“When Congress itself
regulates, the responsibility for the benefits and burdens of the regulation is
apparent. Voters who like or dislike the effects of the regulation know who to
credit or blame. By contrast, if a State imposes regulation only because it has been
commanded to do so by Congress, responsibility is blurred.”).
215. See id.
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billions of dollars due to retaliatory tariffs, the federal government has
been forced through political pressure to provide billions of dollars in
farm subsidies.216 In this instance, the system of dual sovereignty has
worked correctly, as the same sovereign that harmed its constituents
reaped the political costs. A federal prohibition on Alaska’s economic
relationship with its largest trading partner, however, could impose
similar costs on Alaska through political pressure to provide subsidies,
even though Alaska would not be responsible for the prohibition itself.
The argument that the anti-commandeering doctrine protects
Alaska’s economic relationship with China from federal interference does
face challenges. The anti-commandeering doctrine has only been
interpreted to protect state actions where the federal government has
sought to direct the states to regulate in a certain way.217 While Alaska’s
promotion of its economic relationship with China is not regulation,
Alaska nonetheless acts within its sovereign capacity when it promotes
the welfare of its citizens.218 The anti-commandeering doctrine thus
protects Alaska’s promotion of its economic relationship with China
because the anti-commandeering doctrine protects state sovereignty, of
which regulation is only one part.
Relatedly, the Supreme Court has approved federal regulation of
state governments where those governments are regulated in the same
manner as private parties.219 Private businesses, too, conduct trade
missions, open offices overseas, promote their exports and tourism, and
solicit foreign direct investment. As already stated, however, the Alaska
state government represents its citizens in its capacity as sovereign when
promoting its economic relationship with China. The anticommandeering doctrine thus protects Alaska’s promotion of its
economic relationship with China as part of Alaska’s sovereignty under
the Constitution.

V. CONCLUSION
As globalization proceeds apace, Alaska finds itself caught between
two superpowers. While Alaska seeks to expand its economic
relationship with China, the U.S. federal government seeks to prevail in a

216. Tara Golshan, Trump: “Tariffs Are the Greatest.” Also Farmers Need $12
Billion in Aid Because of Tariffs, VOX (July 24, 2018, 1:00 PM), https://www.vox.
com/2018/7/24/17607484/trump-tariff-farmers-emergency-aid.
217. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
218. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 n.17 (2007) (dismissing the
dissent’s argument that the Court created a new state standing doctrine in finding
the state could act as parens patriae while protecting quasi-sovereign interests).
219. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000).

KARSON - V6.1 (FINAL VERSION) (DO NOT DELETE)

76

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

5/19/2019 11:34 AM

Vol. 36:1

trade war and to ensure its national security against increasing Chinese
economic espionage. So far, the U.S. federal government has not
attempted to drag Alaska directly into its foreign policy by prohibiting
Alaska from promoting its economic relationship with China. As relations
between the U.S. federal government and China sour, however, Alaska’s
economic vitality increasingly hangs in the balance.
It is, therefore, more important than ever for Alaska to be prepared
to defend its sovereign prerogative to advance the welfare of its citizens
through foreign economic engagement, as the New England states did
during the embargo of 1807. While Alaska cannot stop the federal
government from regulating foreign commerce itself, Alaska can ensure,
through the anti-commandeering doctrine, that political accountability is
properly apportioned under the constitutional structure of dual
sovereignty and that the correct political actor is held responsible for any
economic fallout from the regulation of foreign commerce. The anticommandeering doctrine would thus be the proper approach for
resolving this conflict between Alaska and the U.S. federal government,
as the conflict would go to the heart of the constitutional boundary
between sovereignties enforced through the anti-commandeering
doctrine.

